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Appealing, threatening or nudging? Assessing various communication strategies to promote tax compliance

  • Andris Saulitis*
  • , Philipp Chapkovski
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies
  • University of Duisburg-Essen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines the effect of various communication strategies on wage underreporting and tax compliance. Employing a field experiment with 3813 businesses in Latvia—a country marked by substantial wage underreporting—this research utilizes advanced data analytics to disseminate messages from the tax authority to firms whose declared wages substantially lag behind industry and regional averages. Messages ranged from normative appeals to audit probabilities and nudges. The immediate result was a notable increase in compliance in the first four months after the intervention, with firms elevating average wage levels. While the specific content of messages did not result in distinct long-term compliance behavior, the overall effectiveness of sending messages was affirmed. We identify a message combining 5% audit probability with normative appeals as the most effective one in enhancing tax revenues and triggering minimal negative feedback from the message receivers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)237-275
Number of pages39
JournalPublic Choice
Volume203
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2025
Externally publishedYes

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 17 - Partnerships for the Goals
    SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Keywords

  • Prosocial behaviour
  • Shadow economy
  • Tax audits
  • Tax collection
  • Wage underreporting

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